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Abstract
This study provides a quantitative review of the empirical literature on partisan
politics. Given the voluminous work on this subject, we focus on the relationship
between government ideology and public spending. By exploiting a dataset of 800
estimates from papers published between 1992 and 2018, we find no evidence of
publication bias. Taking into account the differences in the various categories of
spending, proxies of ideologies, estimations methods, as well as, data and publication
characteristics, we find evidence of a small positive and significant effect.
I. Introduction
Partisan theory discusses the idea that a government’s ideological position can
influence its policy-making decisions. Politicians with ties to specific segments of the
electorate adopt policies to enhance the well-being of their core constituencies when in
office, with competing parties having different preferences over policy outcomes
(Drazen, 2000; Franzese and Jusko, 2006). The literature has extensively focused on
the different policies adopted from left-wing and right-wing governments. These
differences are often perceived to be driven by ideological considerations. Hibbs
(1992) argues that the support of the working class to left-wing parties stem from the
fact that these parties are more likely to pursue policies that favour low unemployment.
On the other hand, he argues that right-wing parties draw support from up-scale
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societal groups that have most probably invested in financial capital, favouring policies
that promote low inflation.
Theoretical models introduce rational voters with uncertainty over the election
outcomes resting as the crucial insight that allows for partisan effects on the economy
(Alesina, 1987). This rational partisan theory (RPT) model predicts that these effects
emerge only during the first half of a government’s term after the elections. In the
second half, the party’s identity is already known when wage bargaining contracts are
signed (in the first term). The main implication of the RPT model is that in the case of
a left-wing party (right-wing party) winning the elections unemployment will be below
(above) its natural rate.
The theoretical predictions of the models have been put to empirical test, with
results providing a mixture of evidence conditional upon the set of countries under
consideration and the specific policy instruments under examination. In this study, we
focus on the effects of government ideology on government spending. The
econometric framework is based on simple regression analysis. The typical model uses
as dependent variable any measure of government expenditures and as main
explanatory variable a proxy of government ideology. Similar to the other areas of
applied economics that use regression analysis as the main empirical tool, several other
variables are used as control set.
The evidence is far from being conclusive. Blais, Blake and Dion (1993) show that
left-wing governments spend more than right-wing using aggregated government
spending for 15 countries over 1960–87. The evidence outcome is supported by Cusack
(1997). On the other hand, Bräuninger (2005) and Garrett and Mitchell (2001) do not find
any evidence regarding the effect of ideology on the total amount of government
spending. The results of the literature focusing on disaggregated level of expenditures
remain mixed and inconclusive as well. For instance, Hicks and Swank (1992) support a
positive relationship between more left-wing governments and social welfare
expenditures. Similarly, Jensen (2011) argues that left-wing governments are associated
with higher pensions and family services, but not with higher health care expenditures or
higher unemployment protection. On the contrary, Kittel, Obinger and et al (2003) do not
find any statistical significance to the ideology.
Since ideology is not an observable variable, there are several methods to proxy
it. In order to avoid erroneous conclusions, the main focal variable of our meta-
study is the partial correlation and not the direct estimates from the studies. We
explain further this choice in the next section. Figure 1 gives a brief summary of
the estimated partial correlations through time. One clear message from the figure is
that the empirical findings considerably vary. One of the three targets of our
present meta-analysis is to explain the factors of this variation. Another important
question is to test whether researchers (including both the writers and the editors/
referees) tend to accept more frequently a specific outcome. In our case, this
question can be rephrased as follows: is there evidence of selective reporting in
favour of a more positive relationship between left-wing governments and
government spending. Finally, we explore the statistical and the economic effect (if
any) of ideology on government spending.
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While earlier narrative literature surveys (Potrafke, 2017) have provided important
insights on the partisan politics literature, to the best of our knowledge the current
paper is the first quantitative review that studies the ideology-spending nexus.1 The
partisan politics literature will be further benefited by additional future meta-analytic
work focusing on other policy fields. For instance, it would be interesting to see a
meta-analysis of the effects of ideology on tax, deficit/debt and privatization. In our
study, we collect 28 empirical studies published over the last 26 years and define
aspects related to the different categories of government spending, ideology proxies,
model specification issues, econometric techniques used and data characteristics. We
examine whether these study design issues can explain in a systematic way the
reported estimates found in the collected papers. As discussed in the next sections, we
propose a series of potential drivers that explain the variation of the reported estimates.
We employ a series of model averaging techniques in order to deal with the problem
of model uncertainty. This problem becomes quite significant when the number of
drivers is large and there is no a prior knowledge whether certain factors are more
important than others. In addition, our research examines the existence of publication
bias.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses the process followed
in order to collect the meta-data sample. Section III examines the presence of
publication bias. Section IV describes the moderator variables used in this study, while
Figure 1. Estimated partial coefficient (r) per year of publication
Notes: The figure depicts the estimates (partial correlation coefficients, r) of the effect of ideology on
government spending reported in the empirical literature over time. The horizontal axis shows the
publication year of the examined studies.
1Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari (2001) review the effects of ideology on policy outcomes in general, without
focusing on government expenditures.
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section V presents the econometric model and the baseline results. Section VI presents
a series of robustness checks and additional evidence. Section VII concludes.
II. Data collecting process
The first source of papers is the detailed survey of Potrafke (2017). In order to be as
inclusive as possible, we also searched in Google Scholar using ‘partisan politics’,
‘government ideology’ and ‘government spending’ as keywords. This process produced
75 papers in total. Our inclusion strategy consists of three criteria. The first criterion
for a study to be included in the meta-data sample is to report at least one estimated
coefficient of the effect of government ideology on public spending. Therefore, we
excluded papers that focus on other aspects of public policy outcomes, such as
revenues, debt and unemployment as well as purely theoretical studies. The second
inclusion criterion relates to the broader definition of government ideology. To ensure
a minimum degree of comparability across studies, we include papers that measure the
power of left-wing over right-wing governments. Specifically, we include studies that
measure ideology by the number of seats in parliament by left-wing governments.
Additionally, we include studies that use a variety of ideology indexes. Here, we focus
on three main indexes.2 The chosen proxies assign values in right-to-left scale, with
the minimum value being 1 for extreme right-wing governments to 5 for extreme left-
wing ones. Twenty-five studies use an ideology index in a left-to-right scale, giving
higher value to right-wing government. These studies are excluded from the sample.
Finally, we include papers that use a single dummy variable (1 for left, 0 otherwise) to
distinguish between left and right. The third criterion for a study to be included is to
report at least one measure of precision (either standard error or t-statistic or p-value)
of the reported estimates. Following the guidelines of the Meta-Analysis of Economics
Research Network (Havránek et al., 2020), we summarize the entire study collection
process in a PRISMA chart (online Appendix A).
Using the above three criteria, we end up with 28 papers that empirically explore
the impact of ideology on several categories of government spending. This process
results in a total of 800 estimates which constitute our meta-dataset. All the included
studies are published in journals. However, there was not any prior intention to focus
only on published studies. We found only two working papers that did not satisfy the
last two criteria. The first working paper uses an ideology index on the non-preferable
left-to-right scale. The second one does not report any measure of precision as the
authors indicate the statistical significance of their results using asterisks.3 The full list
of the studies included is provided in the online Appendix G.
As we stressed in the introduction, our analysis relies on partial correlation
coefficients and not on the direct estimated effects reported by the studies or the
corresponding t-statistics. In this way, we overcome the problem of incomparability of
2These indexes are developed by Budge, Keman and Woldendorp (1993), Woldendorp, Keman and Budge
(1998), Potrafke (2009).
3We repeated the process of paper collection during the period of revision without being able to find any
additional working papers.
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where t and df are the t-statistics and the degrees of freedom of the
reported estimates respectively, while i and j refer to the i observation from the j study.




. This approach renders
all estimates comparable.4 As Figure 1 shows the estimates (expressed as partial
correlations) vary. This can also be observed when we split the estimates across
different categories of spending. Figure 2 shows the dispersity of the collected
estimates per spending category. Table 1 reports some additional statistics about the
heterogeneity of the estimated partial correlations. Since there is a small number of
outliers, in what follows we use winsorized data at 5% level. The results, however,
remain robust even when the outliers are included in the dataset.
III. Analysing publication bias
Publication bias is a common feature of economics studies (Ioannidis, Stanley and
Doucouliagos, 2017). This happens when the editors, reviewers and/or the authors are
positively predisposed for a specific kind of result. More analytically, such a bias
appears when different estimates have different probability of being reported depending
on the statistical significance and/or the sign. In a bias-free literature, small imprecise
estimates are equally reported as large imprecise estimates. Therefore, the reported
estimates are not correlated with the standard errors or any measure of precision in
Figure 2. Boxplot of partial correlation (r) per spending category
Notes: The figure depicts the boxplot of the collected estimates (partial correlation coefficients, r). The
estimates are sorted according to government spending categories.
4The calculations follow the technical discussion in Doucouliagos, Haman and Stanley (2012).
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general. When large imprecise estimates are reported more frequently (as this increases
the possibility of a study to be published), then the bias manifests itself with a
correlation between the reported estimates and their corresponding standard errors.
A graphical illustration of the above analysis is traditionally explained through a
funnel plot. Plotting the reported estimates against their inverse standard errors
provides a visual inspection regarding the potential existence of publication bias. In the
case of a bias-free literature, imprecise estimates, which are found in the bottom of the
graph, are symmetrical around a mean that represents the true effect. This is because
both large and small imprecise estimates are reported. In this case, no correlation
between the estimates and their standard errors should be expected. On the contrary, if
positive values are preferred for a certain reason, then the smaller imprecise estimates
will be much less reported than the larger ones. This would produce an asymmetrical
funnel plot and a positive correlation between the estimates and their standard errors.
Figure 3 shows the funnel plot for our collected dataset. As expected, estimates with
less precision (which appear towards the bottom) have more dispersion than estimates
with more precision (which appear towards the top). Interestingly, the funnel plot
reveals a slight asymmetry towards positive values. This visual indication suggests that
TABLE 1
Partial correlations for different subsets
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Military −0.073 0.005 −0.084 −0.062
Health 0.011 0.008 −0.005 0.028
Social 0.049 0.007 0.034 0.064
Educational 0.049 0.009 0.030 0.067
Environmental 0.035 0.009 0.015 0.055
Housing 0.025 0.013 −0.002 0.053
Cultural 0.026 0.012 0.001 0.050
Coalition −0.018 0.003 −0.026 −0.011
Fiscal Pos 0.006 0.019 −0.034 0.046
GDP −0.009 0.007 −0.023 0.004
GDPgr 0.085 0.014 0.057 0.113
Election 0.017 0.003 0.010 0.025
Inflation 0.040 0.025 −0.010 0.091
Unemployment 0.041 0.005 0.031 0.051
Population St 0.039 0.008 0.022 0.055
Population 0.025 0.004 0.017 0.033
Trade 0.087 0.012 0.062 0.113
Labour Power 0.182 0.036 0.108 0.256
Globalization 0.011 0.013 −0.015 0.038
Femate Part 0.049 0.022 0.001 0.096
GMM 0.011 0.005 0.001 0.021
Panel −0.007 0.011 −0.029 0.013
DIV 0.022 0.004 0.013 0.031
Ideo Indexes 0.007 0.007 −0.007 0.022
Economic Journal 0.012 0.003 0.006 0.019
Notes: The table reports the mean, the standard deviation as well as the minimum and maximum values of the
partial correlation coefficients for different subsets of data.
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the literature is characterized by a preference towards positive results, without being
able to identify the cause of a potential bias. As we discuss in the next section, such
preference might be due to heterogeneity.
A formal way of testing the existence of such a bias is the FAT test (Stanley,
2008), estimating the following model;
rij ¼ αþβSErijþuij (1)
where rij is the i-th partial coefficient extracted from the j-th study, SErij is the
corresponding standard error and uij is the error term. When bias exists, there is a
statistically significant relationship between the estimated effect, r, and its standard
error, SEr. More specifically, when positive values are over-preferred than negative
ones, then the estimated beta should be positive and statistically significant. Regardless
of the existence of publication bias, the most precise estimates are concentrated around
the value that represents the true (genuine) effect. Therefore, the intercept, α, is
interpreted as the average effect (here, the average partial correlation corrected for
publication bias) conditional on the standard error approaching zero (Stanley, 2005). In
our case, a positive and statistically significant β would be interpreted as an evidence
of publication bias in favour of reporting more frequently positive values; that is,
researchers are in favour of a positive relationship between ideology and government
spending.
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (1). Firstly, we start with WLS
using the whole sample. Secondly, we apply WLS in a subsample that consists of the
baseline estimates of each study, excluding estimates from any reported robustness
checks. We also apply an instrumental variable specification using as instrument the
inverse of the square root of the number of observations. Havranek, Irsova and
Figure 3. Funnel Plot
Notes: The figure depicts the scatter plot of the collected estimates (partial correlation coefficients, r) and
the corresponding inverse standard errors.
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Zeynalova (2018) stress that some methods (used in the primary studies) may influence
the estimates and their standard errors in the same direction. If this is the case, then the
FAT results will be spurious. They propose the usage of inverse square root of the
number of observations as instrument for the standard error; the root is correlated with
standard error by definition but it is not likely to be correlated with a chosen method.
As an additional robustness check, we also use fixed and between effects. In all
specifications, the standard errors are clustered at study level. All the results are
consistent with the view that the examined literature is not characterized by publication
bias; β is found to be positive (as expected from the slightly asymmetric funnel plot)
but not statistically significant. Interestingly, the effect beyond bias is very close to
zero as the estimated intercept a is also positive but statistically insignificant.
The above analysis is based on the assumption of a linear relationship between the
reported estimate (here partial correlation, rij) and the standard error SErij. If, however,
the relationship is characterized by nonlinearities then the inference could differ. We
perform two recent methods that provide as outcome the mean effect conditional on
different assumptions regarding the functional forms of publication bias. The first is
developed by Andrews and Kasy (2019) who identify the conditional probability of
publication as a function of a study’s results. The publication bias is corrected given
the identification of the conditional probability function (i.e. the probability of a study
being published). Based on a theoretical framework, Furukawa (2019) proposes a
method for correcting the bias that involves minimization of the trade-off between the
bias and the variance. Contrary to Andrews and Kasy (2019), this method uses only
the most precise estimates from each study. In a similar vein, Ioannidis et al. (2017)
propose the usage of the estimates with adequate statistical power. Finally, Stanley,
Jarrell and Doucouliagos (2010) suggest that the usage of the most 10% accurate
estimates is sufficient to reveal the true effect beyond bias. Technical details are
analysed in the online Appendixes B and C. The results are shown in Table 3. Based
on Doucouliagos (2011) taxonomy, the estimated effect from all the methods is
positive but quite small. This effect is expressed as partial correlation and therefore it
does not provide any information about the economic significance. In the robustness
section, we examine whether the evidence of a small partial correlation indicates a
TABLE 2
Funnel asymmetry testing (FAT)
WLS Primary IV FE BE
β 0.056 0.146 0.313 0.399 0.838
publication bias (0.199) (0.354) (0.264) (0.584) (0.536)
α 0.026 0.023 0.006 −0.001 0.002
effect beyond bias (0.028) (0.044) (0.029) (0.045) (0.044)
Observations 800 524 800 800 800
Notes: The table reports the outcome from estimating equation (1). In all specifications the standard errors are
clustered at study level and are reported in the parentheses. WLS refers to weighted least squares results.
Primary shows the WLS output using a subset of the collected primary studies. IV refers to the instrumental
variable estimation using as instrument for the standard error the inverse of the square root of the number of
observations. FE refers to study-level fixed effects and BE refers to study-level between effects.
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significant or an insignificant (statistically and economically) effect, when only a
subsample of comparable studies is used. Before this step, we examine whether other
features of this literature can affect the reported results. This task is addressed in the
next section.
IV. Explaining the observed differences
The next step is to model the reported heterogeneity. We divide the existing literature
into five broad groups of moderator variables, with each group capturing a specific
feature of partisan politics. In particular, we consider the following dimensions: (1) the
spending category, (2) the measures of ideology, (3) the econometric method, (4) the
model specification and data characteristics and (5) the publication features. For each
group, we define several moderator variables in order to capture in detail all the
potential driving forces.
The first group of moderator variables takes into account various types of
government spending. As Figure 2 shows, the literature focuses on both aggregated
(total) and disaggregated amounts. Treating the total government expenditure as the
reference category, we discern among seven broad disaggregated categories; (i)
military, (ii) health, (iii) social protection (iv) educational, (v) environmental, (vi)
housing and (vii) cultural.5 This leads to seven separate dummy variables, with each
assigned to the value of 1, when its corresponding spending category is used. For
instance, the military dummy variable takes 1 if the paper focuses on military
expenditures and so on.
The second major group of moderator variables is related to the different ideology
proxies. Throughout the past three decades, a large number of variables have been
used. As in other quantitative surveys in economics (Arestis, Chortareas and Magkonis,
2015), where it is rather impossible to capture all the variables employed, the best
research strategy is to categorize the proxies into groups. We consider as reference
category the cabinet seat shares of left-wing parties; that is, the number of seats taken
by left-wing parties over the total number of seats in the government. The second
moderator contains papers that have used indexes that measure the degree of
TABLE 3
Genuine effect beyond publication bias
Andrews & Kasy Furukawa Ioannidis et al. Stanley et al.
(2019) (2019) (2017) (2010)
Mean beyond bias 0.038 0.067 0.031 0.079
(0.008) (0.060) (0.124) (0.151)
Notes: The methods applied here are the ones developed by Andrews and Kasy (2019), Furukawa (2019),
Ioannidis et al. (2017) and Stanley et al. (2010). Each entry shows the genuine effect when the publication bias
is corrected. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
5Following Potrafke (2011), cultural expenditures are defined as the amount of money devoted to activities
related to recreational, sporting and religious services and any other activity is related to the promotion of
culture.
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government ideology. More precisely, we focus on three broader indexes that measure
the ideology in a similar way. These indexes include the ones developed by Budge
et al. (1993), Woldendorp et al. (1998) and Potrafke (2009). Higher values indicate
governments are considered to be more left-leaning, while lower values are used for
more conservative governments. Our moderator (called Ideo Indexes) takes 1 when an
index is used and 0 otherwise. Although each index has its own merits, it was not
possible to create a dummy variable for each one of them. That would result in too
many moderators that have only a limited number of 1s and, practically, it would
create problems to the estimation process. However, in order to check the validity of
the above strategy, we discuss an alternative grouping in the robustness subsection.
The third moderator covers all the estimates from papers that use a dummy variable (1
for left, 0 for right-wing) in order to distinguish left from right-wing governments.
This measure has been criticized on the grounds of its simplistic dichotomy which
does not allow to capture intermediate cases like coalition governments (Potrafke,
2017). This moderator variable, named as dichotomous ideological variable (DIV,
thereafter), assigns 1 when the estimate is drawn from a paper that uses a dummy
variable to capture government ideology and 0 otherwise.
The third group captures the different estimation methods that have been used. As
discussed in Potrafke (2017), the econometric technique may be an important factor in
explaining the diversity of the reported estimates. Specifically, the problem of
endogeneity is quite pronounced in the literature of partisan politics; when voters
disagree with the implemented policies (measured by the dependent variable) then this
may affect the government that is elected next time (and therefore its ideology
measured by the independent variable). In order to deal with the reverse causality
issue, researchers have started using instrumental variable methods. This leads us to
separate the estimates from the collected studies into three different categories. The
first, which acts as the reference category, consists of papers that use some form of
least squares (e.g. OLS, pooled OLS or GLS). The second variable is a dummy
variable that takes 1 when the observed estimated coefficient comes from a panel
estimation method (fixed or random effects), while the third one includes the estimates
from studies that use more advanced estimation techniques (GMM or 2SLS) that take
into account the endogeneity problem.
The fourth group of moderator variables refers to the model specification, that is,
the specific form of the estimated equation. Throughout the collected papers, this
equation takes several forms; from a quite parsimonious model, containing four to
eight variables in total, (Bräuninger, 2005; Gaston and Rajaguru, 2013) to a more
extended specification with 15 to 18 covariates (Leibrecht, Klien and Onaran, 2011;
Bove, Efthyvoulou and Navas, 2017). Following the suggestion of Philips (2016) on
the importance of taking into account the specifications that have been used, we
distinguish among 13 variables that are most commonly inserted as control group in
the estimated equation. Furthermore, we account for the number of countries that are
included in each empirical study (ncountries). Finally, we consider the sample period
of each paper by adding the average year of each study (Average Year).
The last group of moderator variables accounts for publication characteristics. The
empirical literature of partisan politics has attracted the research interest of both
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economists and political scientists. Therefore, our collected pool of papers contains
studies published in journals of both fields. In order to capture this specific feature, we
add a dummy variable (Economics Journal) that takes 1 when the estimate corresponds
to a study published in an economics journal and 0 otherwise.6 A second publication
aspect is the journal quality and is captured by adding the impact factor as a separate
variable (ifactor). Finally, we take into account the impact of each study by the
number of citations (citations).7 The Table in the online Appendix H summarizes the
moderator variables and their definitions used in our analysis along with the summary
statistics. Online Appendix D presents the VIF statistics.
V. Meta-regression analysis
The key purpose is to identify the main drivers that explain the variation of the
reported estimates and, therefore, affect the ideology-government spending relationship.
This section explores which of the factors analysed above systematically affect the
reported estimates. Our meta regression model can be written as:
rij ¼ cþβkseri,jþ ∑
29
s¼1
γkSX S,ijþ eij (2)
where r is the partial correlation, the X matrix contains the moderator variables, β is
the coefficient of the standard errors of r, γs are the coefficients of each moderator,
while e ∼ N(0, σ). Using the same notation with the previous section, i is an index for
a regression estimate from the jth study. The uppercase k indicates that the above
equation is valid under model Mk . Our empirical approach is based on Bayesian model
averaging. The technical details are explained in the online Appendix E.
The benchmark findings are summarized in Table 4 that reports the estimated PIPs
as well as the posterior means and standard deviations. To make the results more
legible, we use a visual representation in Figure 4, where the models with the highest
posterior inclusion probabilities are summarized. The horizontal axis measures the
cumulative posterior model probabilities with the best models depicted on the left. As
we move to the right, each model’s posterior probability diminishes. In the vertical
axis, the moderators are sorted by descending order according to their PIP. In other
words, variables on top of the axis play a more significant role in explaining
heterogeneity as compared to the ones in the bottom. The red colour (lighter grey)
indicates that the variable is included, and its estimated sign is negative, while the blue
colour (darker grey) indicates a positive sign.
Starting from the spending categories, the military dummy variable is found to be
negative across almost all models. This becomes evident from the fact that the
horizontal bar that corresponds to the military variable has no gaps and is continuously
red, indicating that it appears always with a negative sign. Therefore, this variable
proves to be a robust driver of the observed heterogeneity. Our findings support that
6We use the Association of Business Schools (ABS) list as a guide to the distinction between economics and
political science journals.
7The cut-off date for the number of citations is July 2018, when we concluded the data collection process.
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studies that solely focus on military government spending estimate a weaker
relationship between left-wing ideology and expenditures. This is in accordance to the
evidence provided by Albalate, Bel and Elias (2012) and Bove et al. (2017), according
to which military expenditures are higher during right-wing administrations.
The second important finding is that differences in ideology indexes matter. Both
ideo indexes and DIV are found to be present in almost all of the estimated models and
therefore, are having high PIPs. Specifically, the use of an ideology index tends to
produce more positive results. In other words, studies using any of the three ideology
indexes explained above tend to report a more positive relationship between
government spending and left-wing governments. The opposite is true for the case of
DIV; taking into account the ideology using only a dummy variable tends to give less
positive estimates. This means that a simple dummy variable that takes 1 for left and 0
TABLE 4
BMA Baseline results
Variable PIP post-Mean post-SD
ser 0.801c 0.399 0.256
ncountries 0.046 0.000 0.000
Average Year 0.169 0.000 0.000
Military 0.978b −0.068 0.015
Health 0.033 −0.001 0.001
Social 0.049 −0.003 0.002
Educational 0.081 0.001 0.007
Environmental 0.040 0.005 0.004
Housing 0.028 −0.001 0.000
Cultural 0.027 −0.000 0.002
Coalition 0.189 0.009 0.023
Fiscal Pos 0.911b −0.071 0.030
GDP 0.971b −0.157 0.033
GDPgr 0.889c −0.077 0.034
Election 0.033 0.001 0.003
Inflation 0.945c −0.175 0.056
Unemployment 0.119 0.003 0.010
Population St 0.089 0.002 0.005
Population 0.036 −0.000 0.003
Trade 0.982b 0.073 0.023
Labour Power 0.254 0.012 0.031
Globalization 0.033 0.000 0.003
Femate Part 0.111 −0.003 0.023
GMM 0.981b −0.099 0.038
Panel 0.999a −0.092 0.019
DIV 0.911c −0.091 0.041
Ideo Indexes 0.852c 0.071 0.039
Economics Journal 0.059 −0.003 0.009
ifactor 0.033 0.000 0.001
Citations 0.969b 0.000 0.000
Notes: PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability. We assume unit information prior as parameters’ prior and
uniform model prior. a/b/c denotes decisive/strong/positive evidence of a regressor having an effect, respectively,
according to Kass and Raftery (1995).
© 2021 The Authors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics published by Oxford University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
12 Bulletin
otherwise is not able to adequately capture the distinction among different ideological
positions as detailed as an index. At least this is expected for cases where the
distinction between left and right is not so clear (Beck et al., 2001). On the contrary,
in cases like United Kingdom and United States the distinction is easier. Overall, the
measure of ideology employed is proved crucial to the final outcome. Given its
significance as the main explanatory variable of interest, we explore further the
categorization of ideology proxies. More precisely, we make an additional distinction
between the more recent index developed by Potrafke (2009) and all the others. The
results are discussed in the next section.
Figure 4. Bayesian Map-Baseline results
Notes: The horizontal axis measures the cumulative posterior model probabilities, while the vertical one
depicts the moderator variables that are explained in the online Appendix H. Each column shows a
different model. Each variable on the vertical axis is sorted according to its posterior inclusion probability
in descending order meaning that variables on the top of the axis appear more frequently across different
models than the ones at the bottom. Red colour (light grey) shows negative sign, while blue colour (dark
grey) shows positive sign. Blank entries indicate that the variable is not included in the model. 3000
models with the highest posterior model probabilities are shown, while assuming unit information prior as
parameters’ prior and uniform model prior.
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Another important outcome is the issue of the econometric methodology. Both
moderators’ (Panel and GMM) PIPs are found to be decisive and appear constantly in
models with a negative sign. When a more advanced econometric technique is used,
then the reported estimates tend to be less positive. This practically means that studies
that do not take into account endogeneity tend to over-estimate the effect of ideology
on government spending. This may also contribute in explaining the declining trend
reported in Figure 1; more recent studies tend to use more modern techniques that take
into account endogeneity.
The exact specification of the estimated model is also an important aspect of the
literature. Studies that control for the level of economic activity (GDP), the growth
rate (GDPgr), the inflation and the fiscal position tend to produce a smaller partial
correlation, all else equal. Thus, basic macroeconomic fundamentals appear to be key
factors in explaining the observed heterogeneity. This suggests that the level of
development, the inflationary process, as well as, the fiscal conditions are factors that
influence the reported results. The same appears to hold for trade openness.
Specifically, studies that take into account the level of trade openness tend to produce
larger partial correlations. The latter result reflects the so-called ‘globalization effect’
that has been extensively used as control in many branches of applied economics
research (with growth econometrics and growth-finance literature being the most
famous examples). On the other hand, other measures of globalization (like the
globalization index developed by Dreher, 2006) that have been included in the
control set are not found to be statistically significant. Moreover, other
macroeconomic characteristics, like the unemployment rate or the population
structure, do not have a statistically significant effect. This means that the partisan
effect on government spending matters equally for low- and high-unemployment
economies. The same is true for countries with ageing population and those with
younger population, as the population-structure variable is not found to be significant.
Furthermore, neither the coalition nor the elections variables appear to influence
partial correlations, suggesting that the partisan effect on public spending is equally
likely to occur under both coalition and non-coalition governments and regardless of
the timing of elections.
Finally, some publication characteristics can also explain the heterogeneity in
partial correlations. The most influential studies (i.e. those with higher number of
citations) tend to report larger ideology-induced effects on government spending. The
most cited study in our sample (Huber, Ragin and Stephens, 1993 with 1,244
citations) supports the view of a strong and positive relationship. On the other hand,
studies (that are not so recent), as for instance, Kittel and Winner (2005) with much
less citations (323), provide results in favour of a weak relationship between ideology
and spending. It seems that some studies are used as references in the partisan-
politics literature. However, this result should be cautiously interpreted as the
estimated coefficient is almost zero. Finally, we do not find any difference between
publishing in an economics or a political science journal. Therefore, the results of a
study do not depend on whether the analysis is conducted by a political scientist or
an economist.
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VI. Further evidence and robustness exercises
Alternative ideology categories
We start the robustness section by considering a supplementary dichotomy of ideology
proxies. Potrafke (2017) discusses extensively the drawbacks of such measures and his
motivation for the development of a new index discussed in Potrafke (2009). In this
respect, we split the Ideo Index variable into two new candidate drivers; the first is
assigned to 1 only when the Potrafke index is used (Potrafke), while the second takes
1 for all the remaining indexes (Other Indexes). Our results remain quantitatively and
quantitatively the same under this alternative coding and are reported in Table 5. The
TABLE 5
BMA results-Alternative Ideology categories
Variable PIP post-Mean post-SD
ser 0.982b 0.492 0.141
ncountries 0.054 0.000 0.000
Average Year 0.169 0.000 0.001
Military 0.999c −0.078 0.017
Health 0.033 −0.000 0.002
Social 0.056 −0.000 0.003
Educational 0.071 0.001 0.009
Environmental 0.041 0.000 0.004
Housing 0.039 −0.000 0.003
Cultural 0.024 −0.000 0.003
Coalition 0.067 0.001 0.008
Fiscal Pos 0.997a −0.103 0.025
GDP 0.963b −0.091 0.039
GDPgr 0.965b −0.081 0.029
Election 0.031 0.000 0.003
Inflation 0.996a −0.189 0.004
Unemployment 0.171 0.006 0.011
Population St 0.212 0.005 0.012
Population 0.029 −0.000 0.004
Trade 0.981b 0.069 0.011
Labour Power 0.031 −0.000 0.005
Globalization 0.033 0.000 0.002
Female Part 0.063 −0.003 0.011
GMM 0.986b −0.052 0.011
Panel 0.997a −0.110 0.031
DIV 0.997a −0.121 0.030
Potrafke 0.051 −0.004 0.017
Other Indexes 0.998a 0.133 0.024
Economics Journal 0.031 0.371 0.007
ifactor 0.035 −0.000 0.002
Citations 0.943c 0.000 0.000
Notes: PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability. We assume unit information prior as parameters’ prior and
uniform model prior. a/b/c denotes decisive/strong/positive evidence of a regressor having an effect, respectively,
according to Kass and Raftery (1995).
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use of indexes still tends to report a larger partial coefficient supporting the partisan
theory. Also, the DIV continues to be an important driver in conditioning the ideology-
spending nexus; studies that use a dummy variable as ideology proxy report a smaller
effect.
Alternative priors and subsample analysis
The evidence presented so far is based on the usage of UIP and uniform as parameters
and model priors, respectively. This choice is considered appropriate when there is not
a priori knowledge. We check whether the result remain the same assuming hyper-g
and beta-binomial respectively. To facilitate the comparison between the two
estimations, we depict the two PIPs for each variable in Figure 5. Visual inspection
suggests that the PIPs of each variable are almost identical regardless of the set of
priors used. Furthermore, we investigate whether the results are driven by some
specific publications or clusters of observations. For this purpose, we keep only the
primary estimates reported from each study without including the reported robustness
checks. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively the same (Table 6).
Figure 5. Comparison between two different sets of priors
Notes: The graph compares two BMA exercises that use two different sets of priors. The first model is the
model estimated using UIP and uniform as parameters and model priors respectively. The second model
uses hyper-g and beta-binomial as parameters and model priors respectively. The vertical axis depicts the
estimated PIPs and the horizontal axis shows the variables. The cycles and the triangulars show the
estimated PIPs of each variable for each set of priors.
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Alternative model averaging methods
As last robustness control, we estimate the model with alternative model averaging
techniques. First, we apply frequentist model averaging (FMA). Apart from the generic
differences between Bayesian and frequentist methodologies, the key difference
between the two averaging methods is the construction of weights. While in the
Bayesian case the posterior model probabilities are used as weights, in the frequentist
approach the weights can vary depending on the researchers’ preference. One choice is
the usage of information criteria. Another choice that has been used in meta-analysis
framework (Havranek, Rusnak and Sokolova, 2017) is the one proposed by Hansen
(2007). The weights are selected by minimizing the Mallows criterion. The benefit is
their asymptotic properties. The drawback (in all weighting schemes in the frequentist
TABLE 6
BMA results-subsample analysis
Variable PIP post-Mean post-SD
ser 0.704 0.245 0.211
ncountries 0.033 0.000 0.000
Average Year 0.174 0.000 0.000
Military 0.989b −0.082 0.025
Health 0.058 −0.001 0.001
Social 0.017 −0.003 0.002
Educational 0.097 0.001 0.007
Environmental 0.028 0.000 0.000
Housing 0.037 −0.002 0.000
Cultural 0.014 −0.000 0.000
Coalition 0.187 0.007 0.013
Fiscal Pos 0.936c −0.091 0.031
GDP 0.969b −0.134 0.022
GDPgr 0.872c −0.057 0.044
Election 0.022 0.000 0.000
Inflation 0.901c −0.114 0.061
Unemployment 0.124 0.001 0.011
Population St 0.045 0.003 0.002
Population 0.041 −0.000 0.000
Trade 0.872c 0.023 0.023
Labour Power 0.287 0.010 0.012
Globalization 0.025 0.000 0.000
Femate Part 0.177 −0.001 0.002
GMM 0.874c −0.091 0.087
Panel 0.990a −0.075 0.023
DIV 0.923c −0.083 0.087
Ideo Indexes 0.813c 0.062 0.044
Economics Journal 0.074 −0.001 0.003
ifactor 0.002 0.000 0.000
Citations 0.710 0.000 0.000
Notes: PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability. We assume unit information prior as parameters’ prior and
uniform model prior. a/b/c denotes decisive/strong/positive evidence of a regressor having an effect, respectively,
according to Kass and Raftery (1995).
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methods) is that the MCMC algorithms are not anymore an option. This means that the
model space has to be reduced. An appropriate way to do so has been proposed by
Magnus, Powell and Prüfer (2010) and extended by Amini and Parmeter (2012). This
method is based on the orthogonalization of the covariate space that leads to the
significant reduction of the models that need to be estimated.
As an extra robustness check, we apply a closely related averaging scheme
proposed by by Magnus et al. (2010) and Magnus and De Luca (2016). The weighted-
average least squares (WALS) is a Bayesian combination of frequentist model
averaging methods. More precisely, the parameters of each model are estimated in a
frequentist way (least squares). Implementing a semiorthogonal transformation to the
TABLE 7
Frequentist model averaging and weighted-average least squares
Variable
FMA WALS
Coefficient SD Coefficient SD
ser 0.752* 0.420 0.200 0.147
ncountries 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Average Year 0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001
Military −0.064*** 0.025 −0.060*** 0.022
Health −0.018 0.024 −0.017 0.021
Social −0.007 0.020 −0.011 0.018
Educational 0.027 0.024 0.020 0.022
Environmental 0.022 0.026 0.010 0.023
Housing −0.005 0.026 −0.009 0.023
Cultural −0.004 0.026 −0.009 0.023
Coalition 0.098*** 0.038 0.081*** 0.031
Fiscal Pos −0.092*** 0.028 −0.078*** 0.026
GDP −0.164*** 0.028 −0.141*** 0.027
GDPgr −0.089*** 0.026 −0.083*** 0.024
Election −0.034 0.016 −0.002 0.014
Inflation −0.138*** 0.045 −0.104*** 0.040
Unemployment 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.021
Population St 0.021 0.016 0.014 0.015
Population 0.017 0.020 0.015 0.017
Trade 0.091*** 0.026 0.071*** 0.021
Labour Power 0.062 0.041 0.063 0.037
Globalization 0.010 0.023 0.014 0.019
Female Part −0.029 0.042 −0.011 0.037
GMM −0.109*** 0.026 −0.090*** 0.025
Panel −0.097*** 0.018 −0.080*** 0.016
DIV −0.142*** 0.033 −0.117*** 0.032
Ideo Indexes 0.063*** 0.027 0.046*** 0.024
Economics Journal 0.021 0.031 0.011 0.023
ifactor 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.008
Citations 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The WALS column show the results using the Weibull prior. *** and ** indicate statistical significant at
1% and 5%, respectively. For the case of WALS, the asterisks are used for illustrative purposes only and should
be cautiously interpreted as this method is not purely a frequentist one.
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covariate space, the weighting scheme is based on Bayesian approach. The advantage
of combining frequentist and Bayesian analysis is that it allows to reduce the
computational burden. Applying both FMA and WALS leads to results that are
quantitatively and qualitatively the similar to the BMA (Table 7). Overall, the
moderator variables that were found to be robust drivers of the observed heterogeneity
in the prior literature remain the same. Finally, we execute a pure frequentist exercise
without using any weighting scheme. Taking into account the heterogeneity of the
effect sizes, we run WLS. The results support the same evidence (online Appendix F).
Best practice estimations
So far we have explored the factors that explain the heterogeneity of our dataset.
Additionally, we have shown that the partial correlation is small. A natural question is
to ask ‘how small’. The precise answer depends on the exact study design. It is a
standard practice in meta-analysis to assume how the best study would be designed. Of
course, there is not a unique research strategy. Using sample maxima for variables that
are associated with the best practice, sample minima for the variables that depart from
it and sample mean for variables that is not clear what it would be optimal, we create
different designs and we get an estimate of the partial coefficient for each one.
The upper part of Table 8 shows four different ‘best’ scenarios. The first row of
Table 8 shows the size of partial correlation when the best practice is based on the
following design. Firstly, we do not have any prior preference regarding the category
of government expenditures; whether a study focus on total spending or any other
disaggregated category is equally preferable. Therefore, we use sample means for all
the remaining spending moderator variables. Secondly, we assume that any ideology





Using all estimates 0.092 0.079 0.104
Using only Indexes 0.081 0.071 0.092
Using only DIV 0.020 0.009 0.033
Using only Seats 0.067 0.056 0.077
Direct Estimates using log(gov)
Using only Indexes 0.198 0.185 0.211
Using only DIV 0.063 0.052 0.073
Using only Seats 0.103 0.095 0.114
Direct Estimates using percentage of (gov) over GDP
Using only Indexes 0.233 0.199 0.264
Using only DIV 0.098 0.089 0.101
Using only Seats 0.201 0.187 0.233
Notes: The implied estimates are based on the FMA estimations as BMA does not work with the concept of
standard errors. CI stands for confidence interval. ‘gov’ stands for government expenditures and refers to the
form of the dependent variable used in each case.
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Ideo Indexes. As far as the estimation method is concerned, we do prefer studies that
take into account the endogeneity issue. Therefore, we align the sample maximum
value of the variable GMM and the sample minima for Panel and LS. We also plug
sample maxima for the impact factor. Given the lack of evidence regarding the
existence of publication bias, it is legitimate to assign zero for the standard error.
Regarding the average year, we use 2000 as the baseline year. As far as the number of
citations is concerned, we use the sample average. Finally, for the variables related to
the specification, we assign the maximum value (i.e. 1). In this way, we avoid any
potential bias from omitting variables. This leads to an estimated effect of 0.092.
We repeat the same analysis for different choices about the ideology proxy. The
second row shows the result when assuming that the best practice is the usage of an
ideology index. Therefore, we add using the sample maximum of the Ideo Indexes and
the sample minima to DIV. The resulting estimate is 0.081. We repeat the same
exercise, treating the usage of DIV as the best practice design receiving 0.020. Lastly,
the usage of parliament seats as an ideology proxy gives an estimate of 0.067. Based
on Doucouliagos (2011) taxonomy, the estimated effects are small.
The above analysis provides an estimate of the implied partial correlation when the
researcher follows a specific design. However, partial correlation is a measure of
statistical, and not of economic strength of the examined relationship. In order to get
an estimate of the economic strength, we have to restrict our sample to comparable
studies only. For this reason we re-estimate the same model separately using two
different subsets. Looking into the prior literature we discern that half of the papers
use the logarithm of the government expenditure as dependent variable, while the
remaining half of the papers use the percentage of government expenditure over GDP.
Therefore, for each subgroup we evaluate the best practice estimate using the above-
described design. The medium and the bottom panel of Table 8 show the
corresponding estimates when the logarithm and the percentage over GDP is used
respectively.8 In all cases, the implied direct effect of government ideology on
spending is found to be significant.
VII. Conclusions
The present paper is the first study that exploits the plethora of empirical studies on
partisan politics by conducting a quantitative literature survey. The empirical research
on partisan cycles has been extended to various policy fields. The meta-analytic
approach herein focuses on the effects of government ideology on public spending in
OECD economies. The collected papers, which have been published in both economics
and political science journals, cover a period of 26 years providing a significant pool
of reported estimates. The significant degree of heterogeneity of these estimates, both
across and within studies as well as the conflicting results obtained, constitute the main
motivation of our analysis; that is, to synthesize and evaluate the evidence published
8In the case of semilog form, the estimates can be interpreted as elasticities. Therefore, anything more than
0.1 can be reasonably evaluated as economically meaningful. We thank an anonymous referee for stressing this
point.
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so far, by exploring the factors that systematically affect the reported estimates. To this
end, our analysis takes into account a series of factors that are related to different
categories of spending, different proxies of government ideology, alternative model
specifications as well as different methodologies in research design.
According to our findings, one important driver of the results is the adoption of
more advanced econometric techniques that take into account the issue of endogeneity.
Moreover, the government spending categories are found to be an additional important
driver; in accordance to earlier evidence, more left-leaning administrations tend to
spend less for military purposes. Not surprisingly, the proxy for measuring the concept
of government ideology is also an important dimension that influences the reported
results. The usage of ideology indexes tends to report a more positive relationship than
simple measures based on the share of cabinet seats. Finally, the specification of the
estimated equation plays a role in the final outcome, suggesting that the evidence of
the literature hinge on the choice of the control variables which tend to influence the
magnitude of the reported estimates. Interestingly, publication bias does not seem to be
present in the examined literature. Our findings remain robust to a series of robustness
checks that include different model averaging methods, different sets of priors as well
as alternative coding of government ideology.
Overall, our quantitative analysis confirms the main arguments supported by
Potrafke (2017); the relationship between ideology and government spending is
positive and significant, although small. In this context, our findings provide
implications for the study design of the partisan politics literature, especially amid
the heterogeneous trends that emerge in the political landscapes and the
complexities that arise for the measurement of government ideology as already
stressed in the literature. For a more conclusive overview, additional quantitative
surveys are needed though. The present paper is a first attempt to quantitatively
analyse the empirical literature with main focus on a specific aspect of partisan
politics. As future research project will enrich our understanding by examining
other policy-making fields, such as taxation, debt and privatization.
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